Abstract. We consider the amount of randomness necessary in information-theoretic private protocols. We prove that at least Ω(log n) random bits are necessary for the t-private computation of the function xor by n players, for any t ≥ 2. In view of the upper bound of O(t 2 log(n/t)) [23] , this bound is tight, up to constant factors, for any fixed t. For a class of protocols obeying certain restrictions, we give a stronger lower bound of Ω(t log(n/t)). We note that all known randomness efficient private protocols designed specifically for xor belong to this class. In fact we prove slightly stronger statements: we prove that on every input there is a run where the number of random bits used is large, rather than only proving that on some input there is a run where the number of random bits used is large. All our lower bounds hold for the "trusted dealer" model as well, and the Ω(t log(n/t)) lower bound for restricted protocols is tight, up to constant factors, for any t ≥ 2 in this model.
1. Introduction. A t-private protocol for computing a function f is a distributed protocol that allows n players P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, each possessing an individual secret input x i , to compute the value of f ( x) in a way that does not reveal any "unnecessary" information to any coalition of at most t players. The players proceed in rounds, where in each round each player can send a private message to any other player (i.e., each player sends to each other player a message that cannot be seen by any of the remaining players). The t-privacy property means that any coalition of at most t players cannot learn anything from the execution of the protocol, except what is implied by the value of f ( x) and the inputs of the members of the coalition. In particular, the members of the coalition do not learn anything about the inputs of the other players. Private computation in this setting was the subject of considerable research, see e.g. [2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 23, 21, 24, 25, 30] . Randomness is necessary to perform private computations involving more than two players (except for the computation of very degenerate functions). That is, the players must have access to a random source. As randomness is regarded as a scarce resource, methods for saving random bits in various contexts have been suggested in the literature, see e.g. [29, 18] for a survey. Thus, an important research topic is the design of randomness-efficient private protocols, and the quantification of the amount of randomness needed to perform private computations of various functions and under various constraints. This line of research has received considerable attention in recent years, see e.g. [28, 23, 26, 17, 7, 8, 10, 27, 5, 20] . This study also showed that the randomness complexity of the private computation of a function is related to other complexity measures, such as sensitivity and circuit size [28, 26, 17, 7, 27] . The specific function xor (addition modulo 2) was the subject of considerable research in this context due to its being a basic operation and its relative simplicity [28, 27, 8, 23] .
Previous work on the randomness complexity of private computations revealed that there is a tradeoff between randomness and time (i.e., number of communication rounds) for the 1-private computation of the function xor [28, 17] . These works also gave lower bounds on the number of rounds necessary to 1-privately compute any function, in terms of the sensitivity of the function and the amount of randomness used. If one is allowed an arbitrary number of rounds for the computation, there are no known lower bounds on the number of random bits for 1-private protocols computing explicit functions (except that randomness is necessary, i.e., no deterministic private protocol exists). In fact, Kushilevitz et al. [26] gave a relation between the number of random bits necessary to 1-privately compute a function, and the Boolean circuit size necessary to compute it; it is proved that the class of functions that have O(1)-random, 1-private, protocols is equal to the class of functions that have linear size circuits. This surprising connection explains the lack of ω(1) lower bounds on the number of random bits for explicit functions in the case of 1-privacy, as such results would imply superlinear lower bounds on circuit size.
Before our work, ω(1) lower bounds on the number of random bits of t-private protocols (without limiting the number of rounds) have been proved for explicit functions only for values of t that grow with n, and no such bounds have been known if t itself is constant. More precisely, Kushilevitz and Mansour [23] proved that any t-private protocol for xor requires at least t random bits. Blundo et al. [7] gave lower bounds for two special cases. Namely, they proved that if t = n − c, for some constant c, then Ω(n 2 ) random bits are necessary, and if t ≥ (2 − √ 2)n, then Ω(n) random bits are necessary. As to upper bounds, Canetti et al. [10] gave randomness-efficient generic protocols to t-privately compute (for t < n/2) any Boolean function f . They showed that any function f with circuit size of m gates can be computed by a tprivate protocol (t < n/2) using O(t 2 log n + (m/n)t 5 log t) random bits. Kushilevitz and Mansour [23] gave protocols that compute the function xor t-privately, for any t, using O(t 2 log(n/t)) random bits. In the present paper we develop new techniques for proving lower bounds on the number of random bits necessary in t-private computations (for t ≥ 2), and obtain Ω(log n) lower bounds on the number of random bits necessary to t-privately compute the function xor for any t ≥ 2.
1 More precisely, we prove the following theorem. (See Section 2 for a formal definition of a d-random protocol). Theorem 1.1. Let t ≥ 2, and let A be a d-random, t-private, protocol for computing
In fact, we prove a slightly stronger statement: we prove that Ω(log n) random bits are necessary on every input.
In view of the upper bound of O(t 2 log(n/t)) of [23] , our lower bound is tight, up to constant factors, for any fixed t. This is the first result showing that the number of random bits necessary for t-private computation grows with n for constant values of t, and it improves the lower bound of [23] for any t = o(log n). It is interesting to note that our Ω(log n) lower bound holds already for t = 2, while for the case of t = 1, it is known that the function xor can be computed 1-privately, for any number of players n, with only 1 random bit.
All known randomness-efficient private protocols designed specifically for the function xor [28, 23, 27, 8] are built in the following special way. They are based on a deterministic, non-private, protocol for xor. Then, this protocol is modified by changing any message so it is the sum (modulo 2) of the original message, and a value which is a function of the random bits only. Thus, the private protocol is built by masking the original messages of the non-private protocol. We give stronger lower bounds for protocols of this class (see Section 4 for a formal definition of this class). Namely, we give a lower bound of Ω(t log(n/t)) on the number of random bits required by any protocol of this class, to compute xor for n players.
All our lower bounds hold also in the "trusted dealer" model, considered in [23, 10] . In this model, the n players are deterministic, and there is an additional player, the "trusted dealer", who does not get any input, and whose role is limited to "deal" random bits to the other players (hence a "dealer"). This player never participates in any coalition (hence it is "trusted"). For this model, our lower bound of Ω(t log(n/t)) for protocols of the above restricted class is tight up to constant factors for every t ≥ 2, as [23] gave a protocol (of this class) in the trusted dealer model using O(t log(n/t)) random bits.
Our proofs use novel techniques by which we extract from a private protocol random variables that depend on the randomness that the players use. We then use the t-privacy property of the protocol to prove that these random variables must have certain properties (for example, linear independence or t-wise independence). Based on these properties we show that the amount of randomness used by the players must be large. We believe that these new techniques may prove useful for proving other properties of private protocols.
Preliminaries.
In this paper we consider information-theoretic privacy (as in [4, 11] ), where the players have unlimited computational power, no intractability assumptions are made, and messages are sent over private channels.
Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} be an arbitrary Boolean function. A set of n players P i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), each possessing a single private input bit x i (i.e., x i is known only to P i ), collaborate in a protocol to compute the value of f ( x). The protocol is probabilistic. During the course of the protocol each player can toss random coins, where the coin tosses are unbiased and independent. The protocol operates in rounds. In each round, each player may toss some coins, and then sends messages to the other players (messages are sent over private channels so that other than the intended receiver no other player can access them). The player then receives the messages sent to it by the other players. Each player chooses to output the value of the function at a certain round. In a correct protocol, each player must output the correct value f ( x), and stop its operation in a finite number of steps (it may output f ( x) before stopping). That is, for every input assignment x and for every outcome of the coin tosses of all players, each player outputs f ( x), and stops in a finite number of steps.
In Claim 1 below we formally argue that for a given correct protocol involving n players, there is a finite upper bound on the number of coin tosses any single player performs during the course of the protocol. We in fact show that there is a finite upper bound on the total number of coin tosses performed by all players. Claim 1 gives a formal argument for the intuition that a protocol for which such upper bound does not exist is not a correct protocol. For example, consider a protocol where some player keeps tossing coins until it gets a 1, before sending any message. For such protocol, the property claimed does not hold. But, such a protocol does not satisfy the definition of correctness either, as there are possible outcomes of the coin tosses for which some player does not stop in a finite number of steps. We note that since we prove lower bounds on the number of random bits used, we could avoid using Claim 1 by the following argument: we could argue that if on some input, some player may toss more than coins, then a lower bound of is obtained; otherwise one can assume that no player ever tosses more than coins. This would be sufficient to prove lower bounds on the randomness complexity of the protocol (see Definition 2.1). However, we prove stronger statements. Claim 1 is useful in proving that on every input there is a run where the number of coin tosses performed is large, rather than only proving that on some input there is a run where the number of coin tosses performed is large.
Claim 1. Given a correct protocol involving n players, there is a finite upper bound on the total number of coin tosses performed by all players in any run of the protocol.
Proof. We show below that for any input assignment x there is a finite upper bound ( x) on the total number of coin tosses performed by all players in any run of the protocol in which the input assignment is x. Since there is a finite number of input assignments x ∈ {0, 1} n , the claim follows by letting = max x∈{0,1} n { ( x)}.
Fix an input assignment x ∈ {0, 1} n . As in the proof of Lemma 4.10 in [28] , we build a binary tree T x representing the coin tosses of the players on a given input x. Each node of the tree is labeled by the name of a player P i , which tosses a coin. The two outgoing edges from a node are labeled 0 and 1 according to the outcome of the coin toss. Coin tosses in the run of the protocol are ordered by round number, then by player number, and then by a serial number (for that player in that round). Note that the identity of the player to toss the first coin on x, that is, the label of the root, is determined by x, and the identity of any subsequent player to toss a coin is determined by x and the outcomes of the previous coin tosses, that is, by the path leading to a given node of the tree.
Observe that a path of length k from the root to another node represents a run (or a prefix of a run) of the protocol in which k coin tosses occur. Assume towards a contradiction that there is no finite upper bound ( x) on the number of coin tosses performed by the players on input x. Then, for every finite k there is a path of length k in the tree. Since the outdegree of each node of the tree is at most 2, this means that the tree T x must contain an infinite path starting from the root. (cf. König's lemma in [22] .) This path corresponds to a possible run of the protocol (defined by x and the results of the coin tosses as defined by the edges along the path). In this run at least one player tosses an infinite number of coins, i.e., this player does not stop in a finite number of steps, contradicting the correctness of the protocol.
We thus model the players in a correct protocol as being provided with finite binary random tapes. That is, in a correct protocol involving n players to compute a function f each player P i is provided with a local binary random tape R i of length . Note that the value of may be different for different protocols, and different number of players n. The bits in the random tapes are unbiased and independent. We denote by R = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) a given vector of random tapes of all players, and we think of R as a binary vector of length n .
The following definition is used to measure the amount of randomness used in a protocol.
Definition 2.1. (Randomness complexity of a protocol) A d-random pro-tocol is a protocol such that for any input assignment and any vector of local random tapes, the total number of random bits read from the local random tapes by all players is at most d. We emphasize that the definitions allow, for example, that in different executions of a protocol (i.e., different input assignments and different local random tapes), a given player reads a different number of random bits from its local random tape. The number of random bits read by the player may depend on both the inputs of the players, and the random bits read by all players.
We now proceed to consider the messages exchanged by the players. Each player P i receives during the execution of the protocol a sequence of messages. In different runs of a protocol the various players may receive different messages. These depend on the input to the players and on the random tapes. We denote the communication seen by a player as follows.
Definition 2.2. The communication c i ( x, R), of player P i , on input x and vector of random tapes R = {R i } 1≤i≤n , is the sequence of messages that player P i receives during the execution of the protocol, when the input is x and the vector of random tapes of all players is R.
Thus, c i is the (random) variable of the sequence of messages received by P i . For a subset of the players S, we denote by c S the (random) variable of the sequences of messages received by all the players in S. Informally, t-privacy means that any coalition of up to t players cannot learn anything (in particular, the inputs of the other players) from the communication that the members of the coalition receive, except what is implied by the input bits of the members of that coalition, and the value of the function computed. Formally, Definition 2.3. (Privacy) A protocol for computing a function f is private with respect to a subset of the players S ⊆ [n] if the following holds. For any two input vectors x and y such that f ( x) = f ( y), and x i = y i for any i ∈ S, and for any sequence of messages C S , and for any vector of random tapes for the subset S,
where the probability is over the random tapes of the players.
A protocol is said to be t-private if it is private with respect to any subset of players S, such that |S| ≤ t.
It will be convenient in our proofs to use a weaker privacy requirement, directly implied by the t-privacy property, as stated in the following lemma. (Note that since we prove lower bounds, this makes our results only stronger.) Lemma 2.4. Consider any t-private protocol. For any subset S of the players S ⊆ [n] such that |S| ≤ t, and for any two input vectors x and y such that f ( x) = f ( y) and x i = y i for any i ∈ S, the following holds.
1. For any sequence of messages C S ,
where the probability is over the vectors R chosen uniformly from {0, 1} n . 2. For any function φ S of c S , and for any value Φ in the range of φ S ,
where the probability is over the vectors R chosen uniformly from {0, 1} n .
Proof. Let s be the size of S, i.e., s = |S|. Fixing a vector of random tapes for the subset S, {R i } i∈S , is equivalent to fixing a binary vector of length s . The probability of each of these 2 s vectors is 2 −s , and the events corresponding to the various vectors are disjoint. Therefore we have
Using the same arguments, applied to y instead of x, we have that
But, by the privacy property of the protocol we have that for any vector of random tapes for the subset S, {R i } i∈S ,
We therefore obtain that
The second statement of the lemma follows by observing that the value of φ S is fixed given any communication C S .
From the point of view of an observer of the protocol one can define the transcript of a given run of the protocol, which is the set of all messages sent between all players during the execution of the protocol on input x and vector of random tapes R. The transcript is in fact the ordered vector of the communication of all players.
Definition 2.5. The transcript T rans( x, R) of a protocol on input x and vector of random tapes
The following lemma follows immediately from the arguments of the proof of Lemma 4.10 in [28] . We will use this lemma in our proofs.
Lemma 2.6.
[28] For a given input x, let d be the maximum, over all runs on input x, of the total number of random bits read from the random tapes by all players during a given run. Then, the number of different transcripts of runs on input x is at most 2 d . It is convenient in our proofs to consider the messages sent by the players as being messages of single bits. This is done by "breaking" each message into the bits of its binary representation. Formally, for a given protocol involving n players, let M be the set of all different messages that can be sent in the protocol in all different runs (over all possible inputs x ∈ {0, 1} n and all possible vectors of random tapes R ∈ {0, 1} n ). Fix an arbitrary one-to-one binary encoding of fixed length for the messages in M . We note that the empty message is one of the elements of M . We consider a protocol where each player sends instead of a given message from M , a sequence of single bit messages that represent the binary encoding of the original message from M . Henceforth, when we refer to messages we refer to these single bit messages. It is important for our argument that the number of transcripts of the protocol, on any given input x, remains the same. This follows since we use a one-to-one encoding.
Since we consider each message as being a single bit, we can think of a given message m as a Boolean function of the input x, which is a binary vector of length n, and the random tapes of all players, which is a binary vector of length n . We therefore can write m as m = m( x, R).
Our lower bound exploits the fact that the function xor has large sensitivity on every input. Sensitivity is defined as follows.
Definition 2.7. (Sensitivity)
• Given x ∈ {0, 1} n , we denote by x (i) the vector x with its i-th bit flipped.
(Similarly, x (i,j) is x with its i-th and j-th bits flipped.)
• A function f is sensitive to its i-th variable on input
). We will further need the following definitions. Definition 2.8.
• A message m depends on the variable x i if there exist x and R, such that m( x, R) = m( x (i) , R). In other words, m depends on the variable x i , if m is sensitive to x i on some x and R.
• For i ≤ j, a message m depends on a variable x j under the partial assignment
, if there exists an assignment to the remaining variables x i , . . . , x n , and there exists R, such that
. . ,x j , . . . , x n , R). We will use the following simple observation.
If m depends on a variable x j under the partial assignment x 1 = α 1 , . . . , x i−1 = α i−1 , then at least one of the functions f 1 , . . . , f u depends on the variable x j under the partial assignment
3. Lower Bound for General Protocols. In this section we give a lower bound that applies to any t-private protocol for xor, for t ≥ 2. We first outline our approach, which is common to the general lower bound and to the stronger lower bound for the restricted class of protocols (given in the next section), and then proceed to give the proof of Theorem 1.1.
3.1. Our Approach. We state informally the approach we use in our proofs. Our proofs proceed in two stages. First, we prove that in any t-private protocol for xor we can identify q = Ω(n) distinct messages m 1 , . . . , m q with certain properties. Informally these properties are that (1) We can permute the input vector (and accordingly the set of players), such that for any i, message m i depends on input x i , but does not depend on any input x j , j > i. ( 2) The set of receivers of these messages is disjoint from the set of players that have access to the inputs x i , 1 ≤ i ≤ q. In the second stage of our proofs we consider the values of these selected messages on a given input assignment. That is, we consider the vectors representing the values of these messages over the possible random tapes to all players, when the input assignment is fixed. Using the properties of the private protocol and the properties of the special set of selected messages, we then prove, in the case of a general t-private protocol, that these vectors are linearly independent. In the case of a protocol of the restricted class, we prove that all the vectors obtained from sums of at most t/2 original vectors are linearly independent. In each case, this allows us to conclude that the number of different columns in the matrix obtained from the vectors as rows, is "large" (where the extent to which this number is large is different in each case). It follows that the number of transcripts of the protocol on the given input is "large", and hence using Lemma 2.6 the randomness complexity of the protocol is "high".
3.2. Proof of Theorem 1.1. In this section, as well as in the next section, we always assume that the computed function is xor. We now proceed to prove Theorem 1.1. In fact we prove here a stronger claim than the claim of Theorem 1.1. We prove that for any input assignment α = α 1 , . . . , α n , there is a run in which the number of random bits read by the players from their random tapes is Ω(log n).
3.2.1. Selecting the messages. Let α = α 1 , . . . , α n be an arbitrary input assignment. Given a fixed α, we will define a sequence of messages. (We will not indicate in our notation that the choice of this sequence depends on α, but this should be clear from the context.)
We define an ordering of all the messages sent during the protocol, in order to be able to refer to the first message with a given property. Then, based on this ordering, we select a sequence of messages with certain properties. The choice of these messages will induce a particular permutation of the input bits; and since each input bit belongs to a given player, this induces a permutation of the players as well.
Definition 3.1. We define an ordering of all messages, such that in this ordering, any message sent in round i precedes any message sent in round j, for i < j. For the messages sent within the same round we choose an arbitrary ordering.
When we refer to the first message with a given property, we mean the first message according to the above ordering, that satisfies that property.
During the process of selecting the sequence of messages, we also assign a particular numbering to the input bits and to the players. To this end, when selecting a given message, a variable and a player are also selected, and both are given the same number as the message. That is, when the first i messages m 1 , . . . , m i have been selected, the variables x 1 , . . . , x i and the players P 1 , . . . , P i are also already selected. (We assume an arbitrary permutation of the remaining indices i + 1, . . . , n for the remaining variables and players.) When the process ends (after selecting n messages) a permutation of the variables and a permutation of the players is fixed.
We now proceed to the selection process. Let m 1 be the first message in the protocol that depends on at least one input variable. We will argue below that since this is the first such message, it can depend on only one input variable, and without loss of generality, we denote this input variable by x 1 , and the player that has access to it by P 1 .
Let m 2 be the first message in the protocol that depends on at least one input variable under x 1 = α 1 . We will argue below that since this is the first such message, there is only one such input variable, and without loss of generality we denote it by x 2 , and the player that has access to it by P 2 .
Inductively, let m i be the first message sent in the protocol that depends on some input variable under x 1 = α 1 , . . . , x i−1 = α i−1 . We prove the following claim.
Claim 2. Let x k be any input variable on which m i depends under x 1 = α 1 , . . . , x i−1 = α i−1 . Then the sender of the message m i must be the player that has access to the variable x k , that is, player P k .
Proof. Suppose that the sender of the message m i is a player P j such that j = k (i.e., P j is not the owner of x k ). Note that a message m sent in a given round by player P j is a function of only the communication to player P j in previous rounds, its input x j and its random tape R j . Thus, by Observation 1, if P j is not the owner of the variable x k , it can send a message that depends on x k under x 1 = α 1 , . . . , x i−1 = α i−1 , only if it received in an earlier round a message that depends on x k under x 1 = α 1 , . . . , x i−1 = α i−1 . But this contradicts the assumption that m i is the first such message.
The above claim implies that there is only one input variable on which m i depends under x 1 = α 1 , . . . , x i−1 = α i−1 . Without loss of generality we denote it by x i , and the player that has access to it by P i . Thus we derive the following.
Claim 3. 1. The message m i is sensitive to x i on the input α and some vector of random tapes R. 2. Let β be any input that agrees with α in the first i − 1 coordinates, and let j > i. Then the message m i is not sensitive to the variable x j on β and R, for any R. Proof. We selected m i such that m i depends on x i under x 1 = α 1 , . . . , x i−1 = α i−1 . This means that there is some assignment to the remaining variables and some R such that m i is sensitive to x i on the input obtained by the additional assignment and R. But since x i is the only input variable on which m i depends under x 1 = α 1 , . . . , x i−1 = α i−1 this also means that m i is sensitive to x i on α and R.
We obtain the second statement using the observation that x i is the only input variable on which m i depends under
Claim 4. We can continue the above procedure of selecting messages for n steps, and define the sequence of messages m 1 , . . . , m n .
Proof. In a correct protocol to compute the function f , the output of each player has to be equal to f ( α) on any input α. Note that the output of a given player depends only on the communication it received, its input bit and its random tape. Since the sensitivity s(f, α) of the function f ( x) = x 1 + . . . + x n ( mod 2) is n on every input α, we have by Observation 1, for each player P i and each variable x j such that j = i, that the communication received by P i must contain at least one message that is sensitive to x j on the input α and some R. Thus, on any input α, there exists at least one message for each variable x j , that is sensitive to x j on α and some R. If our procedure cannot be continued after k < n steps on some input α, that would mean by Claim 3 that no message is sensitive to any of the remaining variables on α and R for any R, which would be a contradiction.
As argued above, the senders of the messages m 1 , . . . , m n are P 1 , . . . , P n , respectively. Denote by Q 1 , . . . , Q n the receivers of these messages. Note that the n receivers are not necessarily n distinct players. We now select a subset of the above n messages, m i1 , . . . , m iq , with the property that {P ij : j ∈ [q]} ∩ {Q ij : j ∈ [q]} = ∅. That is, none of the receivers of the selected messages is a sender of a selected message.
Lemma 3.2. There is a subset of size q ≥ n 4 of the above n messages, denoted m i1 , . . . , m iq , such that the receivers of these messages, Q i1 , . . . , Q iq are disjoint from the senders of these messages, P i1 , . . . , P iq .
Proof. For the purpose of the proof we define an undirected graph. The set of nodes consists of n nodes, each node v i representing a message m i of the original set of n messages. Recall that each distinct message m i is sent by a distinct player P i . Therefore we can also think of the nodes as representing n distinct players. For each message m i , we put an edge between node v i and node v j , if player P j is the receiver of message m i (i.e., if Q i = P j ).
We now have a graph of n nodes and at most n edges. The graph therefore contains an independent set of size at least n messages that correspond to the nodes of this independent set.
To simplify notation, in what follows we denote by m 1 , . . . , m q , P 1 , . . . , P q , x 1 , . . . , x q , and Q 1 , . . . , Q q , the selected messages, their senders, the input variables these senders have access to, and the receivers of the messages, respectively.
3.2.2.
Properties of the vectors defined by the selected messages. We will now consider the 2 n -bit binary vectors that represent these messages on input α. We denote by m( α) the binary vector of length 2 n that consists of the bits m( α, R). Thus, for any i, the vector m i ( α) consists of the bits m i ( α, R). For ∅ = S ⊆ [q] we denote by m S ( α) the bitwise mod2 sum of the vectors m i ( α), for i ∈ S. That is, m S ( α, R) = ⊕ i∈S m i ( α, R).
Lemma 3.3. Let m 1 , . . . , m q be selected as above in a t-private protocol. For any ∅ = S ⊆ [q] of size at most t, and any i, j ∈ [q] (where i = j),
Proof. Consider the set of players S = {Q i |i ∈ S}, that is, the coalition formed by the receivers of the messages m i , for i ∈ S. Then φ S (c S ) = ⊕ i∈S m i ( α, R) = m S ( α, R) is a function of the sequence of messages received by the players in S . Recall that the set of senders of the messages m i is disjoint from the set of the receivers, that is
and therefore for any i, j ∈ [q], P i and P j are not in S . This means that for any i, j ∈ [q] and for any l ∈ S , α l = α
, that is, the input bits held by the members of the coalition S are not changed when one flips the i-th and j-th bits of α. Note also that flipping two bits does not change the value of the xor function, that is
, when f is the xor function. Thus, we can apply Lemma 2.4 to S and φ S = m S , and the second statement of Lemma 2.4 directly implies the statement of the present lemma.
For i = 1, . . . , q, we denote by h i ( α) the bitwise mod2 sum of the vectors m i ( α) and m i ( α (i) ). Thus, the vector h i ( α) is 1 in the coordinates corresponding to R such that m i ( α, R) and m i ( α (i) , R) differ, and 0 where they agree. We denote by h i ( α, R) the entry of h i ( α) in the coordinate corresponding to R. Lemma 3.4. Let m 1 , . . . , m q be selected as above in a t-private protocol. Let ∅ = S ⊆ [q − 1] be a subset of size at most t, and let k be the largest element of S. Then
Proof. Since k is the largest element of S and q is larger than any element in S, we get by Claim 3 that m S ( α (k,q) ) is the bitwise mod 2 sum of the vectors m S ( α) and
. To see this observe that for any 1 
Thus, m S ( α (k,q) , R) and m S ( α, R) are complements of each other in the coordinates where h k ( α, R) is 1, and agree where h k ( α, R) is 0. We therefore have
and,
Since by Lemma 3.3
we have that Lemma 3.5. Let ω 1 , . . . , ω q be selected as above in a t-private protocol, for t ≥ 2. Then, the vectors ω i ( α), i = 1, . . . , q − 1 are linearly independent over the reals.
Proof. As we will see in the next section, our job would be much easier (and we could obtain stronger bounds) if the vectors h k ( α) were the same for each k. In that case we could show that the vectors ω i ( α), i = 1, . . . , q − 1 (or some projections of them) are pairwise orthogonal. However, in general the vectors h k ( α) may not be the same. Nevertheless, we can show that a given projection of each vector ω k ( α) is orthogonal to the same projection of each preceding vector ω i ( α) for i < k. This will let us show that for any k such that 2 ≤ k ≤ q − 1, the vector ω k ( α) cannot be obtained as a linear combination of the vectors ω 1 ( α), . . . , ω k−1 ( α).
Consider an arbitrary k ∈ {2, . . . , q − 1}, and consider the following projection of the vectors ω 1 ( α), . . . , ω k ( α). Note that our choice of the projection depends on k (via h k ( α)) and this is indicated in the notation by the superscript k. For i = 1, . . . , k, denote by v k i the projection of the vector ω i ( α) to only those coordinates where h k ( α, R) = 1. Note that h k ( α) is not identically 0, as stated in Claim 5, so there is always at least one such coordinate.
Since t ≥ 2, by applying Lemma 3.4 to the sets {i, k} for i < k we get that the inner product of v k k with any of the vectors v k i for i < k is 0. To see this, consider ω S ( α) for S = {i, k}. Considering {1, −1} vectors instead of {0, 1} vectors, Lemma 3.4 states that
Thus, { R:h k ( α, R)=1} ω S ( α, R) = 0. Notice that for S = {i, k}, the above sum is exactly the inner product of the vectors v Let us now consider the (q − 1) × 2 n matrix, formed by the vectors ω i ( α), i = 1, . . . , q − 1 as row vectors. Since the vectors ω i ( α), i = 1, . . . , q − 1 are linearly independent, this matrix has at least q − 1 different columns. This implies that the protocol has at least q − 1 different transcripts on input α. Since q = Ω(n), Theorem 1.1 follows by Lemma 2.6.
Restricted Protocols.
In this section we consider a class of restricted protocols that we define below. Our motivation to consider this class is that all known randomness-efficient protocols designed specifically for xor obey this restriction, or can be easily brought to this form without changing the number of coin tosses performed [28, 23, 27, 8] . Informally one can describe the protocols of this class in the following way. First, a deterministic, non-private, protocol to compute f is defined. Then this protocol is modified by masking each message with randomness by adding to it (modulo 2) a value that depends on the randomness only. This restriction was previously considered in [28] . Formally the restriction we consider here is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1. We say that a given protocol involving n players has a restricted form if each message of the protocol can be obtained as a mod 2 sum of a Boolean function u : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} that depends on the input variables only, and a Boolean function v : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} that depends on the random tapes only. That is, each message m can be written as m( x, R) = u( x) + v( R) mod 2.
Theorem 4.2. Let t ≥ 2, and let A be a d-random, t-private, protocol, obeying the above restriction, for computing f ( x) = x 1 + . . . + x n (mod2). Then d = Ω(t log(n/t)).
As in our proof for general protocols, here too we prove in fact a stronger claim. We prove that for any input assignment α = α 1 , . . . , α n , there is a run of the protocol in which the number of random bits read by the players from their random tapes is Ω(t log(n/t)).
Proof. Let α = α 1 , . . . , α n be an arbitrary input assignment. We select a sequence of messages m 1 , . . . , m q and define the corresponding vectors as in the previous section. Recall that h i ( α) denotes the bitwise mod2 sum of the vectors m i ( α) and m i ( α (i) ). The restriction on the protocols we consider allows us to have the following claim.
Claim 6. The vectors h i ( α), i = 1, . . . , q are identically 1. Proof. We know by Claim 5 that the vectors h i ( α) are not identically 0. That is, they have at least one entry with value 1. This means that m i ( α, R) = m i ( α (i) , R)
for at least one R. But m i ( x, R) can be written as m i ( x, R) = u i ( x) + v i ( R) mod 2. It follows that u i ( α) = u i ( α (i) ), and therefore for any R, m i ( α, R) = m i ( α (i) , R).
The above claim allows us to obtain a stronger bound using the machinery of the previous section. We now prove the following lemma. Lemma 4.3. Let ω S be defined as above in a t-private protocol obeying the above restriction, for t ≥ 2. Then, the vectors ω S ( α), such that ∅ = S ⊆ [q − 1] and |S| ≤ t/2 are linearly independent over the reals.
Proof. First note that since t ≥ 2, there exist sets S, such that ∅ = S ⊆ [q − 1] and |S| ≤ t/2 , thus the statement of the lemma is meaningful (assuming n ≥ 5; otherwise q − 1 could be less than 1, since the guarantee of Lemma 3.2 is that q ≥ Notice that for any two sets S 1 and S 2 , we have ω S1 ( α, R) · ω S2 ( α, R) = ω S1 S2 ( α, R). Thus, for sets ∅ = S 1 ⊆ [q − 1] and ∅ = S 2 ⊆ [q − 1], each of size at most t/2 , the inner product of ω S1 ( α) and ω S2 ( α) must be 0. We get that the vectors ω S ( α), for ∅ = S ⊆ [q − 1] and |S| ≤ t/2 are pairwise orthogonal, and therefore they must be linearly independent over the reals.
We denote by is associated with a fixed vector of random tapes R, and each column is completely determined by the transcript of the protocol on the given R and α. This implies that the protocol has at least q−1 ≤ t/2 different transcripts on input α. Since q = Ω(n), the theorem follows by Lemma 2.6.
We find it worthwhile to note that our proof also implies that the random variables associated with the messages m 1 , . . . , m q on input α are t-wise independent in any t-private protocol that obeys the above restriction. Thus, we could conclude the proof of Theorem 4.2 by referring to the known lower bounds on the size of sample spaces with t-wise independent random variables [12, 1] . In fact, part of the proof of Lemma 4.3 is analogous to the corresponding part of the argument used in [12] . The t-wise independence property of the random variables associated with the messages m 1 , . . . , m q on input α follows by Lemma 3.4, which, as we have shown above, gives in the case of the restricted protocols that P r R [m S ( α, R) = 1] = 1/2, for any ∅ = S ⊆ [q − 1] of size at most t. This implies t-wise independence of the corresponding random variables by the results of [12] .
